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Policy Points:
 The Pay for Success (PFS) financing approach has potential for scaling
the implementation of evidence-based prevention interventions inMed-
icaid populations, including a range of multicomponent interventions
for childhood asthma that combine home environment risk mitigation
with medical case management.
 Even though this type of intervention is efficacious and cost-saving
among high-risk children with asthma, the main challenges for im-
plementation in a PFS context include legal and regulatory barriers to
capturing federal Medicaid savings and using them as a source of private
investor repayment.
 Federal-level policy change and guidance are needed to support PFS
financing of evidence-based interventions that would reduce expensive
acute care among Medicaid enrollees.
Context: Pay for Success has emerged as a potential financing mechanism for
innovative and cost-effective prevention programs. In the PFS model, interven-
tions that provide value to the public sector are implemented with financing
from private investors who receive a payout from the government only if the
metrics identified in a performance-based contract are met. In this nascent field,
little has been written about the potential for and challenges of PFS initiatives
that produce savings and/or value for Medicaid.
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Methods: In order to elucidate the basic economics of a PFS intervention in
a Medicaid population, we modeled the potential impact of an evidence-based
multicomponent childhood asthma intervention among low-income children
enrolled in Medicaid in Detroit. We modeled outcomes and a comparative
benefit-cost analysis in 3 risk-based target groups: (1) all children with an
asthma diagnosis; (2) children with an asthma-related emergency department
visit in the past year; and (3) children with an asthma-related hospitalization in
the past year. Modeling scenarios for each group produced estimates of potential
state and federal Medicaid savings for different types or levels of investment,
the time frames for savings, and some overarching challenges.
Findings: The PFS economics of a home-based asthma intervention are most
viable if it targets children who have already experienced an expensive episode
of asthma-related care. In a 7-year demonstration, the overall (undiscounted)
modeled potential savings for Group 2 were $1.4 million for the federal
Medicaid and $634,000 for the state Medicaid programs, respectively. Tar-
geting children with at least 1 hospitalization in the past year (Group 3)
produced estimated potential savings of $2.8 million to federal Medicaid and
$1.3 million to state Medicaid. However, current Medicaid rules and regula-
tions pose significant challenges for capturing federal Medicaid savings for PFS
payouts.
Conclusions:Amulticomponent intervention that provides home remediation
and medical case management to high-risk children with asthma has significant
potential for PFS financing in urban Medicaid populations. However, there
are significant administrative and payment challenges, including the limited
ability to capture federal Medicaid savings and to use them as a source of
investor repayment. Without some policy reform and clear guidance from the
federal government, the financing burden of PFS outcome payments will be on
the state Medicaid program or some other state-level funding source.
Keywords: Pay for Success, social impact bonds, childhood asthma, home-
based intervention, economic modeling.
I nvesting in health and human services programs that arepreventive in nature is challenging for the public sector. Allocatingscarce public resources for potential and diffuse future gains can
be difficult given more acute, immediate needs. In addition, the pay-
offs from upstream investments in prevention, especially those aimed at
children, are often realized in different fiscal years under different ad-
ministrations and are spread across a number of departments or agencies.
The Pay for Success (PFS) financing model—also referred to as social
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impact bonds—has emerged as a potential solution to these challenges
and as a means to increase public spending on innovative and cost-
effective prevention programs.1
In the PFSmodel, interventions that provide value to the public sector
are implemented with financing from private investors who will receive
a future payout from the government only if the metrics identified in a
performance-based contract aremet, based on a third-party evaluation.2,3
As of December 2017, 18 PFS projects were launched in the United
States, all of which focus on key social determinants of health and
well-being, including education, employment training, housing, and
psychosocial risk factors.4 Although there are some challenges with the
PFS model, the early experience in the United States suggests that this
financing approach “holds great promise as a way to bring private-sector
resources to efforts aimed at population health and decreasing health
inequities.”5
PFS is an innovative response to the challenges of implementing ef-
fective programs in the context of public-funding constraints and of in-
vesting in preventive interventions that result in government efficiency.
These goals have particular relevance to Medicaid and the Children’s
Health Insurance Program, in which more than 70 million Americans
were enrolled in November 2017, including more than 35 million
children.6 The nascent field of PFS is attempting to identify interven-
tions with a strong evidence base that will provide value to the public
sector in a reasonable time frame and also allow for payout to the private
investors. This article presents an in-depth examination of the viability
of using a PFS financing approach to implement an evidence-based mul-
ticomponent intervention for childhood asthma in an urban Medicaid
population.
Background
Asthma is a serious and growing problem among children in the United
States, especially those living in low-income urban communities with
a degraded housing stock and poor air quality.7 A number of high-
quality research studies have concluded that multicomponent home-
based interventions aimed at children and adolescents are effective
both in controlling and reducing asthma symptoms and in reducing
health care costs, including expensive emergency department visits and
Pay for Success Financing and Childhood Asthma 275
hospitalizations.8-13 Although there is some variation in programdesign,
this intervention typically combines 2 home-based components: (1) an
environmental assessment and subsequent tailored mitigation of major
asthma triggers (eg, air pollutants, mold, dust mites, cockroach diges-
tive material, mouse urine, and other allergens) through special cleaning
processes, mattress and pillow coverings, air filters and air conditioning,
and/or minor structural repairs and (2) case management that provides
patients and their families with intensive education and supports to
reduce asthma triggers, better manage symptoms and medications, and
improve coordination among needed services.
Additional research is needed to further understand the relative
impact and benefits of the 2 components in different environments and
among children with different allergies and sensitivities. Nonetheless,
the Community Preventive Services Task Force recommends multicom-
ponent home-based interventions (tailored to individual allergies) as
an evidence-based approach to childhood asthma control, recognizing
the diversity of programs and approaches.8 This family of interventions
appears to be appropriate for a PFS financing model for a number of
reasons. First, the intervention is not only effective, but it has also
been demonstrated to be cost-saving if targeted at children at highest
risk for serious asthma attacks. Cost-benefit analyses indicate average
savings of $5 to $14 in averted medical costs and lost productivity per
dollar spent on the intervention.8-13 Second, other than through the
use of special federal demonstration authority under Section 1115 of
the Social Security Act, no federal Medicaid funding is available for the
intervention’s environmental mitigation component (eg, fixing leaky
pipes, filling in structural cracks that promote mold growth, removal
of moldy carpeting, allergenic furniture coverings, pest control, HEPA
filters). To date, only Massachusetts has received permission to pay for
some of these costs using federal Medicaid funding as part of a broader
1115 Medicaid demonstration. Thus, private funding is essential to
scale the delivery of this evidence-based intervention in the Medicaid
population.
A PFS approach would allow private sector capital to be used to
implement and spread an effective approach to addressing an important
social determinant of health (housing-based asthma triggers). Indeed,
there is growing interest in multicomponent childhood asthma inter-
ventions among PFS stakeholders and socially minded investors, with
several projects under way nationwide. In a project in Fresno, California,
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Social Finance, Inc. and Collective Health, with funding from the
California Endowment, are undertaking a PFS “proof-of-concept”
project to measure the health outcomes and costs of a multicomponent
home-based asthma intervention.14 In this demonstration, 200 Medi-
caid beneficiaries affiliated with a federally qualified health center and
diagnosed with uncontrolled asthma are receiving home visits that in-
clude education, assessment and remediation of environmental triggers,
and disease management.14 The goal is to reduce emergency department
visits by 30% and hospitalizations by 50%, which is projected to
decrease average per-child health care costs by $1,000 to $5,000.14,15
Also in California, the Alameda County Department of Public Health
is partnering with the county’s Healthy Homes Department to conduct
a feasibility analysis regarding the potential of a PFS approach to scale a
case management and home remediation intervention aimed at children
with persistent and serious asthma in Medicaid managed care organiza-
tions (MCOs). This project is one of the first nationally to investigate
the potential for an MCO, rather than the government, to serve as the
potential end payor.16 Preliminary health improvements are impressive,
suggesting significant reductions in emergency visits and hospitaliza-
tions in a 6-month period.17
A similar project is planned in Baltimore, Maryland, led by the Green
and Healthy Homes Initiative (GHHI), a national nonprofit organiza-
tion that provides technical assistance for root-cause housing assessments
and remediation.18 GHHI is working with private investors and a Med-
icaid MCO in Baltimore to bring about a PFS initiative in which 1,800
children who have been hospitalized or visited the emergency room for
asthma will receive a multicomponent home-based intervention. If a
rigorous evaluation demonstrates cost savings, the MCO would pay a
portion of the savings to the investors. Based on this work, GHHI, in
partnership with the Calvert Foundation, received a Social Innovation
Fund grant from the Corporation for National and Community Ser-
vice in 2014 to expand their work on housing and health. GHHI and
Calvert solicited applications through an open competition to partici-
pate in regional home-based asthma projects that would further assess
the PFS feasibility of this intervention. Projects for whichGHHI/Calvert
Foundation are providing technical assistance to community-based or-
ganizations and partners are under way in Buffalo, New York; Grand
Rapids, Michigan; Memphis, Tennessee; Salt Lake County, Utah; and
Springfield, Massachusetts.18,19
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Research Objectives
There is clearly great interest in using PFS financing to scale multi-
component home-based childhood asthma interventions in low-income
populations, including in the Medicaid population. Understanding the
PFS potential of this intervention requires understanding of the costs
and benefits to both state and federal Medicaid programs. We modeled
the economics of one version of this intervention in an urban-basedMed-
icaid population under different assumptions and time frames to better
understand the benefits and costs in a PFS context. Our primary aim was
to reveal the potential for and policy-related challenges of this type of
PFS initiative, with information that complements the empirical results
being produced by current demonstrations in the field.
Methods
Model
In order to understand the general economics of a PFS demonstration of a
multicomponent childhood asthma intervention, this analysis employed
methods developed by Altarum Institute researchers that synthesize
existing knowledge about the impact of a prevention intervention on
health outcomes and costs, and then simulate population-level outcomes
with andwithout the preventive intervention, allowing for a comparative
benefit-cost analysis.20 The scenariosmodeledwere designed to estimate,
under different sets of assumptions and target populations, the general
range of potential state and federalMedicaid savings for different types or
levels of investment, the time frames for savings, and some overarching
challenges—all of which provide essential information upon which an
actual PFS demonstration in this area could be designed.
The population context for this simulation was low-income children
with asthma who are enrolled in Medicaid managed care in Detroit,
a city with high rates of childhood asthma and an older, deteriorating
housing stock. In 2016, approximately one-half of children in Detroit
were enrolled inMedicaid, with 5MedicaidMCOs covering themajority
of beneficiaries.21 For simplicity, the modeling exercises were conducted
using the total population of Detroit children with asthma enrolled in
Medicaid, rather than attempting to parse the population into specific
MCOs. A PFS demonstration regarding this intervention could involve
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a single MCO (and thus a portion of the total population) or could be
a more comprehensive initiative orchestrated by the state that would
include all of the MCOs serving children in Detroit.
The intervention evaluated was a single-year multicomponent home-
based demonstration project that included a home assessment followed
by a “moderate” level of remediation for environmental triggers, as well
as home-based education and case management with a trained profes-
sional to improve asthma management. Moderate remediation consists
of providing households with allergen-impermeable mattress and pil-
low covers, small air filters and dehumidifiers, pest control services,
professional cleaning services, and minor structural improvements (eg,
patching holes, cleaning mold). This remediation is more intensive than
simply providing fabric covers while less expensive than major home
modifications (eg, removing carpet, replacing ventilation systems, or
major structural projects).22
Using data regarding the Detroit Medicaid population under age 18
in 2014 and the diagnosed prevalence of persistent childhood asthma
in Detroit in 2010 (the most recent year for which data were available),
we examined 3 potential target groups for the intervention, based on
the severity of the child’s asthma: Group 1, all children under age 18
diagnosed with persistent asthma; Group 2, those with at least 1 asthma-
related emergency department (ED) visit in the past year; and Group 3,
those with at least 1 asthma-related hospitalization in the past year.
In 2014, the Detroit Medicaid population included 126,982 chil-
dren under the age of 18, of whom 7,619 (6.0%) were computed to be
in Group 1, 3,642 (3.9%) were in Group 2, and 510 (0.4%) were in
Group 3, using the 2010 prevalence rates, the most recent data avail-
able for the Detroit population.23,24 These data were used to approxi-
mately characterize the Detroit asthma population in 2016, the assumed
intervention year.
In all scenarios, Medicaid savings occur through a reduction in health
care costs, primarily through reduced ED visits and hospitalizations from
asthma. The reduced costs for care are assumed to result in reduced per-
member, per-month capitation payments (paid to the MCO by the state)
that begin 2 years after the initial intervention year. The intervention
impact was tracked for 5 subsequent years. Thus, each scenario has a
7-year duration: the intervention occurs in year 0, capitation rates are
reset during year 1, and savings are realized in years 2 through 6.
Pay for Success Financing and Childhood Asthma 279
Methods and Data
The analysis was based on recent historical rates of asthma prevalence
and ED/hospitalization usage among children enrolled in Medicaid in
Detroit, assuming that those rates would remain constant during the
intervention period in the absence of the intervention: annual ED visits
were estimated at 405.8 per 10,000 and hospitalizations were estimated
at 48 per 10,000 in the absence of the intervention.24 We also assumed
that 70%of target population homeswould accept the home remediation
component of the intervention, based on prior research.25
We modeled the impact of a home-based asthma intervention similar
to those used in previous, rigorous academic studies (ie, home assessment
followed by “moderate” remediation plus case management).22,25,26 Us-
ing data from previous studies, we estimated the expected costs of the
intervention as follows: $1,187 per household in year 0, $71.22 per
household per year for subsequent monitoring and follow-up, inflated
by 2.02% per year using the average growth in the Medical Care Con-
sumer Price Index (CPI) over the previous 5 years from the Bureau of
Labor Statistics.27 (Previous studies of “moderate” remediation quote
intervention costs per household that range between $518 and $2,131;
we selected $1,187 as a central value among these estimates.) These
intervention costs reflect additional services to be provided through
the intervention, beyond the services currently covered by Medicaid
in Michigan. Added to the costs of the intervention was an additional
$75,000 each year for administrative and data costs and a rigorous third-
party evaluation, which is required in a PFS contract.
Based on the published results of randomized trials of this inter-
vention, we estimated an expected 36% reduction in ED visits and
37% reduction in hospitalizations, persistent over the duration of the
demonstration.8,9,21,25-27 The model, in turn, estimated the impact of
these reductions on total asthma-related costs for Medicaid, assuming a
cost per hospitalization of $3,827 and a cost per ED visit of $561.28,29
These costs were inflated by 2.02% per year using average growth in the
Medical Care CPI.
The total projected savings to Medicaid as a result of this intervention
are the number of ED visits and hospitalizations averted multiplied
by the cost to Medicaid of each visit or hospitalization. To estimate
state versus federal Medicaid savings, we apportioned between federal
and state governments in proportion to the federal and state share of
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Medicaid spending from fiscal year 2014 for Michigan, with 69% of
the savings accruing to the federal government and the remainder to
the state.30 Given that the scenario is in an MCO environment, we
estimated potential savings to state and federal Medicaid (in contrast
to MCO-level savings) that could potentially result from a future lower
capitation rate (the per-member, per-month rate paid to the MCO by
the state per child). We assumed 1 year would be required to conduct
the intervention and another year would be needed to establish the lower
capitation rate based on reductions in ED visits and hospitalization. The
projected Medicaid savings were therefore delayed 2 years to account for
the lag required to adjust the Medicaid capitation rate.
States set capitation rates (fixed periodic payments for a defined
package of benefits) for Medicaid MCOs under federal statutory and
regulatory authority, which includes requirements that these rates be
actuarially sound. In the face of an expenditure reduction in an MCO
as the result of an intervention, a state Medicaid program might decide
not to immediately readjust the capitation rate, continuing instead with
current assumptions regarding the costs associated with asthma-related
emergency care and hospitalizations. This would enable MCOs and their
private investor partners to carry out the intervention and evaluate its
health and economic effects over a longer period of time.
To guard against excessive profit-taking in lieu of social investments,
a state might set net revenue target expectations in its contracts, thereby
promoting ongoing MCO investment in environmental interventions.
In this way, an MCO could use the revenue it captures from capitation
payments to invest in the continuation of the intervention while repay-
ing its investor. In either case, a cost-saving intervention funded by a
private investor is providing social impact (improved housing stock and
decreased asthma emergencies) in the Medicaid population. However,
the public sector would realize a return only after sufficient time had
elapsed to enable accuratemeasurement of the impact of such investment
and to incorporate the results into the rate-setting system.
Since the primary goal of this analysis was to estimate potential pub-
lic savings in reduced Medicaid childhood asthma-related health care
costs, we assumed a fairly rapid readjustment of capitation rates. Al-
though other scenarios are possible, this analysis provides an estimate
of potential public savings, which is useful (rather than proscriptive)
information for policymakers.
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Limitations
The analysis ignored any benefits of the intervention to other children
in the household who were not specifically targeted for the intervention,
assuming that full intervention costs would be incurred for each targeted
child, even if multiple children with asthma lived in the same household.
This assumption likely underestimates the benefits of the intervention.
We also assumed that the predicted decreases in ED and hospitalization
use from the intervention would persist for 5 years following the inter-
vention, an assumption supported by prior research.26,27 The modeling
did not take into account compensating behaviors by hospitals in the
face of decreased asthma admissions, additional costs of tailoring inter-
ventions based on child allergic sensitization tests, decreases in Medicaid
enrollment over time, or children aging out of coverage. We discuss the
implications of the latter omission in the next section. In addition, we
assumed that the children in Group 2 and Group 3 would exhibit sim-
ilar ED and hospitalization use in the intervention year as in the past
year. Our sensitivity analysis (described in the next section) estimates
the potential impact of this assumption.
Findings
For each of the 3 target group scenarios, modeling exercises produced es-
timates of the total and per-capita pre-intervention frequency and costs
of asthma-related hospital admissions and ED visits per year (in 2016
dollars), the total intervention cost including for a PFS demonstration
and evaluation, and the effect of the intervention on averted hospitaliza-
tions and ED visits if 70% of the children in each targeted group accept
the intervention (Table 1). (The assumption of a 70% participation rate
is not critical to the analysis. Except for the relatively small fixed costs
of program administration and evaluation, both costs and benefits of the
intervention are proportional to this rate.) The results reveal that as the
intervention population becomes more narrowly targeted and focused
on asthma severity (Groups 2 and 3), the total intervention costs de-
crease and the economic impact of the intervention per targeted child
increases. Because we assumed, absent the intervention, the same ED
and hospitalization use in the intervention year as in the past year, the
number of averted ED visits is the same for Groups 1 and 2, and the
number of averted hospitalizations is the same for all 3 groups (these
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Figure 1. Estimated Cash Flows for Home-Based Asthma Intervention
in Different Target Groups (Investor Repaid First)
assumptions are relaxed in the sensitivity analysis described later in this
section).
Figure 1 depicts the positive and negative annual cash flows associated
with the 3 target populations (Groups 1-3). In each scenario, the analysis
assumes that the investor is repaid first, with up to a 10% return on
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investment if the intervention generates sufficient savings, before any
savings are realized by Medicaid. Separate cash flows are shown for the
investor, federal Medicaid savings, and state Medicaid savings. In each
of the 3 scenarios, positive returns are realized starting in year 2, the
year in which lower capitation payments from the state to MCOs begin.
While the structure of an actual PFS payout would be more complicated
due to legal constraints and would likely be spread out over the
demonstration period (as discussed later), the results elucidate whether
or not the intervention would generate Medicaid savings sufficient
to repay investors with a return on the investment in each of the
3 scenarios.
For Group 1 (the target population of all children with persistent
asthma in the Detroit Medicaid population), the costs of implementing
the intervention include an initial investment of $6.4 million in year
0 and investments in years 1 through 6 of $465,000 to cover annual
administrative and evaluation costs and continued education and case
management. In subsequent years, the investor is repaid as Medicaid
savings are generated. As shown in Figure 1, Panel A, this broad tar-
geting of patients does not generate sufficient savings to fully repay an
investor by the end of year 6, and it produces no net savings to Medicaid.
Assuming a 3% discount rate, the net present value (NPV) for the entire
flow of funds to all 3 parties at year 6 is a negative $2.6 million, and the
investment generates an overall internal rate of return (IRR) of –9% at
year 6. In summary, the target population of all children with persistent asthma
(Group 1) is not economically viable for a 7-year PFS demonstration premised
on Medicaid savings. It would cost significantly more to implement the
intervention in this broad target population than the Medicaid savings
that would be generated.
For Group 2 (amore narrow target population of children with asthma
who incurred at least 1 ED visit in the past year), there is an initial invest-
ment of $3.1 million to implement the intervention and investments
of $260,000 to cover annual evaluation and case management costs
in subsequent years (Figure 1, Panel B). In this scenario, an investor
could be repaid with a 10% success payment in year 5 (6 years after
the intervention is initiated). Assuming a reduction in the per-member
capitation rate paid by the state to the MCO, Medicaid would realize
savings by year 5 (approximately $586,000 for the federal government
and $262,000 for the state government) and somewhat larger savings
(approximately $827,000 for the federal government and $372,000 for
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the state) in year 6. The NPV at year 6 is $1.7 million and the overall
IRR is 15%, suggesting a significant overall return. As such, the target
population of all children with asthma with at least 1 ED visit in the past year
(Group 2) appears to be economically viable for a 7-year PFS demonstration
premised on Medicaid savings.
For Group 3 (children with persistent asthma with a least 1 hospi-
talization in the past year), an initial investment of $499,000 in year 0
and subsequent investments in years 1 through 6 of $101,000 to cover
annual evaluation and case management costs are needed. In this sce-
nario, with a smaller yet higher-risk population, the investor could be
fully repaid with a 10% return in year 2 with some additional modest
savings to Medicaid in that year (totaling approximately $247,000 for
the combined federal and state savings; see Figure 1, Panel C). Sav-
ings to Medicaid in subsequent years range from $640,000 in year 3 to
$683,000 in year 6 for the federal government, and from $287,000 to
$307,000 for the state (these annual values grow gradually as a result
of inflation in the cost of ED visits and hospitalizations). At year 6, the
NPV is $3.5 million, and the overall IRR at year 6 is 86%, suggesting
a large overall financial return. In summary, the target population of all
children with asthma with a hospitalization in the past year (Group 3) appears
to be the most economically viable for a 7-year PFS demonstration premised on
Medicaid savings.
For Groups 2 and 3, the estimated savings from the intervention are
underestimated to the extent that other child Medicaid beneficiaries with
asthma live in or visit the same household as the high-risk child targeted
for the intervention. The estimated 5 years of savings postintervention,
however, are also an overestimate given that the model does not account
for attrition from the intervention population due to migration and
the loss of Medicaid eligibility for various reasons, including aging
beyond 18 years. Further, there could be additional costs to Medicaid for
prescription drugs if adherence to self-management of asthma protocols
improves as a result of the education and case management components
of the intervention. Although some children on Medicaid remain on
Medicaid as adults, many will age out of the program at age 19. For
Group 3, this overestimation bias in the results is not a serious concern,
given that the savings through year 2 are sufficient to repay the investor
with an incentive payment (Figure 1, Panel C). For Groups 1 and 2,
the overestimation bias may further reduce the potential cost savings,
which, as discussed, are already limited.
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Figure 2. Medicaid Savings Summary in 7-Year Demonstration
(Groups 1-3)
Figure 2 summarizes the overall (undiscounted) savings to federal and
state Medicaid for each of the 3 target population scenarios in a 7-year
demonstration. Targeting all patients with at least 1 ED visit in the past
year (Group 2) yields a savings of $1.4 million to the federal government
and $634,000 to the state government. Targeting only those patients
who had at least 1 hospitalization in the past year (Group 3) results in a
savings of $2.8 million to the federal government and $1.3 million to
the state.
Payments to an investor in scenario 3—the most economically viable
scenario for a childhood asthma PFS program—could be paid out over
time instead of at the end of a demonstration project. A payout structure
could use a “fixed-debt” model in which the investor is paid interest
(assumed to be 4%) on the initial investment in each year after the
initial investment, followed by repayment of the initial loan and any
success payment (up to 10%) in year 5. The cash flows for this model for
scenario 3 are presented in Figure 3. The overall results are similar to
those shown in Figure 1, Panel C, although the total savings to Medicaid
is slightly lower given the additional interest payments to the investor.
Sensitivity Analysis
We have conducted sensitivity analyses on some of the assumptions
used for the Group 3 results shown in Figures 1 and 2. These results
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Figure 3. Cash Flows for Intervention for ChildrenWith AsthmaWith
at Least 1 Hospitalization in the Past Year (Group 3), Fixed-Debt Model
were based on an assumption that the intervention would target the
most expensive patients based on their ED and/or hospital use in the
year before the intervention (Groups 2 and 3), and that, absent the
intervention, the average annual use of these resources by this group
of patients would be the same as in the previous year. In reality, the
target population might experience future utilization rates that differ
from those observed before the year of the intervention. Prior research
has observed the regression-to-the-mean phenomenon, in which many
of the highest users of health care in a population in a given year typ-
ically do not have a similar high rate of use the following year.31,32
To investigate the impact of the assumption of unchanged utilization
rates over time, we conducted sensitivity analysis by varying the annual
number of hospitalizations that would occur without the intervention
in Group 3 from 100% of the hospitalizations observed in the year
before the intervention (likely an overestimation of the intervention ef-
fect) down to 5% of that hospitalization rate. The results reveal small
positive savings to Medicaid with a hospitalization rate as low as 10%
of its pre-intervention level and substantial savings for smaller reduc-
tions in the rate. For example, if the hospitalization rate drops to as
low as 50% of its pre-intervention level, federal Medicaid savings fall
from $2.8 million to $1.3 million and state savings are reduced from
$1.3 million to $574,000. The reductions in savings are necessarily less
for hospitalization rates between 50% and 100%.
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The effect sizes used in our analysis were based in part on results from
single-group pre- and posttest design studies, in which some of the
perceived benefit of the intervention might be caused by the problem
of regression to the mean noted above. Another way to investigate this
issue is to infer our estimate of effect sizes only from randomized con-
trolled trials (RCTs) involving both an experimental group and a control
group. Including only RCT results in our effect size estimates decreased
the predicted effectiveness of the intervention to a 16% reduction in hos-
pitalizations and an 11% reduction in ED visits. At these lower levels,
the intervention remains capable of repaying investors and producing
substantial savings to Medicaid, generating $721,000 in savings to the
federal government and $324,000 in savings to the state.
Our assumption that the benefits of the intervention would persist
for the duration of the demonstration project was based on a single
study in which persistence was tracked for 1 year postintervention.
We therefore tested the sensitivity of our results to the duration of
persistence of the intervention. If the benefits persist for as little as
2 years following the intervention, enough savings would be generated
to repay investors, save the federal government $597,000, and save
the state $268,000. If, however, no benefits remain after a single year
following the intervention, the project would not produce sufficient
savings to repay investors.
Discussion: How to Capture Savings
to Pay Back the Investors
The modeling results presented earlier demonstrate that a multicompo-
nent home-based intervention targeting high-risk children on Medicaid
has the potential to save costs since the savings from the predicted
reduction in ED visits and hospitalizations are greater than the costs
of delivering the intervention. A key component of any PFS initiative,
however, is how to capture the potential public savings to make a payout
to the private investors. Given current Medicaid law and regulation, it
is generally not permissible for the federal Medicaid program to make
payments to private investors, especially when the services involved are
outside of “medical assistance” or what Medicaid is authorized to cover.
Even if an intervention produces significant state and federal Medicaid
savings, there can be no federal financial participation (FFP) or federal
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matching funds in a state Medicaid program payout to investors. As
such, capturing both state and federal Medicaid savings for a PFS
investor repayment is quite challenging.
In the current Medicaid legal/regulatory context, we have identified
4 general options for structuring a payout to a private investor in a
PFS childhood asthma initiative: (1) the MCO makes the payout to
the investor; (2) through a Medicaid MCO incentive agreement with
the state, the MCO repays investors using financial incentive payments
for which limited FFP would be available; (3) the state Medicaid
program makes the payout to the investor using state savings only; and
(4) the payout comes from a state and/or federal fund outside of the
Medicaid program, allocated for PFS outcome payments. These sources
of success payments are not mutually exclusive, and PFS initiatives
involving Medicaid would likely involve more than one of these funding
strategies.
Payment Source 1: MCO Savings
To the extent that the PFS intervention reduces the cost of serving plan
enrollees below the amount of capitation revenue theMCO receives from
Medicaid, the MCO may retain these savings and use them to repay
private investors. This form of savings does not immediately produce
state or federal savings because the amount paid by Medicaid to the
MCO was negotiated and set in advance. In addition, the MCO savings
might not continue indefinitely since future capitation rates need to
be actuarially sound, reflecting the fact that actual managed care costs
have declined below the original rate. The shifting downward of MCO
capitation revenue because of a successful asthma intervention can be
viewed as penalizing the MCO for prevention success, yet this is the
only way for the public sector to actually save money in a managed care
context.33
If an MCO reduces its costs below the capitation rate, the state does
not necessarily have to reduce the rate accordingly, including if the
costs of care were not reduced for most persons in the broader Medicaid
population. Nonetheless, it is the reduction in the capitation rate for
a particular MCO that produces state and federal Medicaid savings.
Otherwise, the public expenditures remain the same while the MCO
uses its savings to repay the investor.
290 P.M. Lantz et al.
Payment Source 2: MCO Incentive Payments
As described in the preceding segment, if the intervention is successful in
reducing health care use, the MCO could use the resulting savings from
within its capitation payment to make success payments to the investor.
In addition, Medicaid regulations permit state contracts with MCOs to
have “incentive arrangements” that include additional payments above
negotiated capitation rates for achievement of agreed-upon outcomes.34
As such, the stateMedicaid program couldmake “incentive payments” to
the MCO, which also could contribute to investor repayment. Incentive
payments that qualify for federal Medicaid matching funds are limited
to 5% of the approved capitation payments attributable to the enrollees
and/or services covered by the incentive arrangement.34 For example,
for a $150 monthly capitation payment, the MCO could receive an
additional $7.50 incentive payment for enrollees with asthma. The state
and federal government would each pay a portion of the $7.50, according
to the Federal Medical Assistance Percentage (FMAP) formula for the
state.
Incentive payments in the Medicaid program are structured to re-
ward MCOs for reducing the costs of covered services while maintaining
quality. These small incentive payments were not designed to finance
upstream social interventions outside of “medical assistance” that pro-
duce later Medicaid savings. Thus, while this arrangement allows federal
Medicaid funds to be used in a PFS demonstration with an MCO, the
5% cap significantly limits the amount of federal matching funds a
state can use in the incentive agreement with an MCO. As such, while
this approach allows for some federal financial participation in anMCO’s
success payment to an investor, the state bears the majority of the burden
of capturing savings and making a payout to the private investor.
Payment Source 3: State Medicaid Program
Savings Alone
Given the restrictions faced by the federal Medicaid program in captur-
ing savings for success payments to private investors, a third option is to
use only state Medicaid savings (primarily through lowered capitation
rates) in such payouts. As long as the state Medicaid program is willing
to forgo FFP in such payments, making success payments (including a
rate of return) to PFS investors is legally permissible.
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Nonetheless, as revealed in the economic analyses previously dis-
cussed, this model is only feasible in the third scenario, in which the
target population receiving the intervention is those high-risk children
who had a hospitalization for asthma in the past year. In the Detroit
environment, it would cost approximately $1.1 million to implement
and evaluate the intervention in this population, for an estimated $1.3
million in net savings to the state Medicaid program over the next 6
years. This is close to a break-even point, which does not allow for much
of a return on the investment or for any unexpected challenges with the
intervention implementation or its anticipated impact. This model, in
which the state Medicaid program absorbs the full repayment to the
investors, could also be feasible in the other scenarios if the state were
to prioritize cost-effectiveness (the value provided by the intervention is
worth the costs) over actual public savings.
Given the current FMAP in Michigan, the federal Medicaid program
would realize approximately $2.8 million in net savings from this in-
tervention over a 7-year period and would keep all of the savings, while
the Michigan Medicaid program would come close to breaking even in
terms of economic benefits and costs. From a broad PFS perspective, this
is a successful model in which the public sector writ large works with
the private sector to launch a successful prevention effort that improves
health outcomes and reduces public expenditures at no risk to taxpayers.
Even so, the fairness of the distribution of the economic benefits between
the state and federal Medicaid program can be questioned.
Payment Source 4: PFS Fund Authorized
Outside of Medicaid Program
The challenges and limitations in using federalMedicaid savings to repay
private PFS investors suggest an important role for the establishment of
special, centralized public funds, separate fromMedicaid or other public
programs, that can be used for PFS outcome payments. Such flexible
PFS funding would also help resolve the “wrong pocket” problem, in
which an intervention produces savings to more than one government
program and/or government level, but no single agency or program has
the resources or financial incentive to entirely fund the intervention.
The establishment of such funds or appropriations is recommended
by a number of organizations in the PFS field, including Third Sector
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Capital Partners and the Urban Institute. In addition, a Government
Accountability Office (GAO) report recommended that the federal gov-
ernment could play a number of different roles in supporting and incen-
tivizing PFS demonstration projects, including the further development
of funding mechanisms that are outside of specific federal programs,
departments, or agencies.35
Several local and state governments have already established and ap-
propriated centralized funds that will be used to pay back investors if
the success metrics of PFS contracts are met. For example, in 2012,
Massachusetts became the first state to implement authorizing legisla-
tion for PFS initiatives, including the Social Innovation Financing Trust
Fund “for the purpose of funding contracts to improve outcomes and
lower costs for contracted government services” via PFS public-private
partnership initiatives.36
In addition, federal legislation has been introduced to incentivize PFS
initiatives and other social impact partnership projects at the federal,
state, and local levels, including the establishment of funding for suc-
cess payouts within the Treasury Department. Most recently, H.R. 576
and S. 963 (both named Social Impact Partnerships to Pay for Results
Act) were reintroduced in the 115th Congress. These bills encourage
partnerships between the private and public sectors to improve domes-
tic social programs through pay-for-performance activities that scale
effective social interventions and to establish oversight authority and a
funding source for investor payouts within the US Department of the
Treasury.37,38 The establishment of such funds or trusts at the local,
state, and federal levels is critically important to PFS activities in that
it formally signals strong political and economic support for the PFS
model and appropriates funds for investor payouts that are outside of
the rules and regulations that govern funds within specific agency or
program budgets.
Conclusions and Policy Implications
We conducted a series of modeling exercises to estimate the total amount
of savings to both state and federal Medicaid programs that could result
from a home-based multicomponent childhood asthma intervention in
an urban Medicaid population in the context of PFS financing. Under
different assumptions regarding targeting and some general assumptions
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about evaluation and administrative costs and a 10% return on invest-
ment for investors, the modeling results reveal a number of general
conclusions.
First, assuming a goal of Medicaid cost savings or breaking even, this
intervention is economically viable in a PFS context only if the target
population is children with persistent asthma who have experienced
at least 1 ED visit and/or hospitalization in the past year. Focusing
the intervention on the target population of children with a recent
prior hospitalization for asthma (Group 3) would likely be the most
attractive scenario to investors because of the higher rate of return on
the investment and the shorter time period inwhich significantMedicaid
savings are realized. For the broad population of all children with asthma
(Group 1), Medicaid savings would not be sufficient to pay for the
intervention. The obvious downside of such narrow targeting is that it
does not capture the long-term value to Medicaid of mitigating health
risks to children who in the future easily could, without intervention,
fall into the highest risk category. The need to produce shorter-term
savings is an inherent limitation of the PFS financing model.
Second, there are legal impediments to capturing the significant fed-
eral Medicaid savings that would be realized for investor repayments. If
the success payments are financed entirely through state Medicaid sav-
ings, the target group must be the highest-risk children (Group 3) and it
will take a relatively long time (7 years) to recoup the savings needed to
repay the investor. In this financing model, the state Medicaid program
would essentially break even while the federal Medicaid program would
retain significant savings. The state, however, would likely be capturing
some additional savings due to the improved health of children and their
siblings, increased school attendance, increased employment attendance
and productivity of parents, improved housing stock, etc—savings that
are difficult to observe and estimate.
Third, to overcome the investor payout challenges in the Medicaid
program, the establishment of centralized government PFS funds at the
state and federal levels is critically important if PFS financing is to
be successful in improving outcomes and reducing costs in the Med-
icaid population. It should be noted that there are many other barri-
ers to launching PFS projects in addition to the challenges associated
with the public sector making performance-based payments to private
investors.3,5 Nonetheless, the investor payout challenge is fundamental
and must be overcome in any PFS initiative.
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In summary, our modeling results add additional support to current
efforts to spread the use of multicomponent home-based interventions
for childhood asthma in urban low-income populations through the PFS
financing model. However, even though the intervention is clearly effi-
cacious and cost-saving among high-risk children, there are significant
challenges for implementation in a PFS context, including the limited
ability to capture federal Medicaid savings and to use them as a source of
investor repayment. Federal Medicaid policy does not recognize states’
ability to share savings with private investors, even when these sav-
ings are well documented and relate to evidence-based interventions
of proven public health value. This puts the financing burden of PFS
success payments primarily on the state Medicaid program.
The revised Centers for Medicare and Medicaid Services (CMS) man-
aged care regulations that went into effect in June 2016 might hold
some promise for states “to create broadly applicable value-based pur-
chasing frameworks that enable managed care entities to undertake
service-delivery innovation and, if desired, finance the projects using
Pay for Success mechanisms.”39 It appears that under these regulations
a state and an MCO could enter into an agreement that includes a
value-based purchasing program for a home-based asthma intervention
that targets a specific, high-need population based on medical need.
It also, importantly, appears that such services could be considered as
“medical expenses” to be counted in the numerator of the medical loss
ratio formula.39 These and other changes allow for greater flexibility in
funding nonmedical interventions and the ability to capture Medicaid
dollars in success payments to investors.39 Although organizations like
the Green and Healthy Homes Initiative are cautiously optimistic about
the ability of these new regulations to support PFS financing of environ-
mental and other types of public health interventions in Medicaid pop-
ulations, additional clarity and guidance are greatly needed from CMS.
Another policy solution to these challenges would involve amend-
ing federal Medicaid law to expand the definition of what constitutes
medical assistance to include evidence-based interventions that can com-
plement covered services for children, which would enable states to pay
for such interventions as part of coverage itself. Medicaid offers impor-
tant coverage flexibility not found in private health insurance in the
form of payment for intensive care management, preventive counsel-
ing, and anticipatory guidance to families. These services are all part
of Medicaid’s Early and Periodic Screening, Diagnostic and Treatment
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(EPSDT) benefit, of historic importance in the evolution of child health
policy.40 Furthermore, states have the flexibility to cover EPSDT ben-
efits when furnished in home-based and other nontraditional locations
found outside clinical settings.
It would not be a huge stretch to expand the definition of EPSDT to
include certain types of supplies, equipment, and home-based services
associated with environmental risk reduction in an asthma context.
Given EPSDT’s preventive purpose, such services could be made avail-
able not only to children who already have severe asthma but also to
those who live in households in which high levels of triggering risks
are determined to be present. Under such a scenario, a PFS approach
would not be needed. The federal and state governments could jointly
make such investments, and any savings would stay within the programs
rather than be shared with private investors. In the absence of changes
in the federal statute to permit such an expanded definition of medical
assistance for EPSDT purposes, the federal government could allow such
an approach to proceed as a Section 1115 demonstration. As such, clear
CMS guidance is also needed in regard to using incentive payments or
value-based purchasing as a way to make payments to private investors
if success outcomes are realized.
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